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POLICE SCIENCE NOTES*
Admissibility of Recorded Wire
Tapping Evidence-The Supreme

troduction of the pamograph records. Davis v. State, 200 Ind. 88,

Court of Minnesota in the recent
decision of State v. Raasch, 275 N.
W. 620 (Minn., f937) upheld the
admissibility of a recording of wire
tapping evidence. Because of the
importance of this decision in the
field of police science, the following excerpts from the court's opinion are here reproduced:
"Upon examination of the record
we find that the witnesses who
testified to the transcribing of the
telephone conversations upon the
pamograph records sufficiently
identified the defendant's voice,
True, they did not know his voice
at the time they staited making the
records, but not only did the defendant respond to his name when
his office was called on the telephone, but after the making of the
records these witnesses saw the defendant and heard him talk re-

161 N. E. 375, 382.
"For the convenience of court
and counsel, the recorded conversations were transcribed in typewritten form and were used to follow the conversations as they were
reproduced by the pamograph
in court. The pamograph was
equipped with a sufficient number
of headsets so that the jury, court,
and counsel could listen to the record while the conversations vere
being reproduced. At times the
court did riot use the headset which
was provided for it, but, in the
presence of jury and counsel, followed the typewritten transcript.
Objection was made by the defendant to the court not listening
through the headset. While it
would have been preferable for the
court to have listened, we do not
think there was any prejudice to

.peatedly, so at the time they testi- the defendant in its not doing so.
fled they were able to testify posi- The jury and counsel for both partively that the voice they had heard ties heard the conversations as reover the telephone at the time the produced, the court was at all times
pamograph records were taken was present and in control of the trial,
the defendant's voice. They also and had any objection been made
recognized and identified the voices or question raised it could have
acted. There were occasions upon
of other participants in the conversations who were identified with the trial when the needle of the
the gamblers. They said that the reproducing mechanism jumped
conversations they heard were from one groove of the record to
truly recorded by the pamograph another, thus omitting a part of
and truly reproduced by that in- the conversation, but in such cases
strument in court. In our opin- the record was played over and
ion this was a sufficient identifica- the whole conversation reproduced.
tion of the defendant as a partici- The typewritten transcripts were
pant in the conversations, and laid not introduced, but used as mema sufficient foundation for the in- oranda to refresh the memory of
* Edited by Fred E. Inbau and M. Edwin O'Neill of the Scientific Crime
Detection Laboratory of Northwesterm University School of Law.
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the witnesses who had heard the
conversations that were recorded.
In each instance they were checked
back against the pamograph records. We think their use was not
prejudicial.
"The fact that there was no record made of those parts of the
telephone conversations which related to subjects other than those
of which the defendant stands here
accused did not render the relevant part of the conversations inadmissible. The operators of these
machines were informed as to the
nature of the conversation which
they were asked to record, and so
when the conversation began to
relate to other subjects they did
not record it. If there was further
conversation which the defendant
thought bore upon the matter, he
was, of course, perfectly at liberty
to show it by the other party to the
conversation if he did not care to
go upon the stand."
Blood Grouping Tests-Paternity
Determinations- Effect of Expert
Testimony- Two very interesting
decisions were rendered recently
by the California Supreme Court
and by the District Court of Appeals. In the case of Arais v.
Kalensnikoff, 74 Pac. (2d) 1043
(Calif., 1937) an interesting and
important question arose regarding
the utilization of the results of
blood grouping tests in a paternity
determination. At the trial the results of the test were admitted and
they indicated the impossibility of
the defendant's being the father of
the child in question. Nevertheless, because of other evidence introduced at the trial the court
found in favor of the plaintiff. Upon appeal to the Second Appellate
District Court the case was reversed and for the following rea-
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sons as they appear in the appellate court's opinion:
"Is there substantial evidence in
the record to sustain the finding of
the trial court that defendant is the
father . . . ?
"The questibn must be answered
in the negative. The law is settled
that courts will take judicial notice of all matters of science and
common knowledge ....
It is likewise settled that it is not the province of this court to decide disputed questions of fact, and we are
bound to give plaintiff the benefit
of all favorable inferences which
may be drawn from her testimony
and that of other witnesses; yet we
are not required to believe what
physical facts demonstrate to be
untrue or that which is contrary
to immutable physical laws....
Hence a finding of fact based solely
upon the testimony of a witness
contrary to a scientific fact will be
set aside by this court on appeal
as not supported by substantial
evidence.
"Applying the foregoing rules to
the instant case, we take judicial
notice of the Landsteiner Blood
Groupings and the results derived
therefrom upon test.
"In passing, our research discloses that the blood-grouping test
requires only a few drops of blood,
is painless and in no way is prejudicial to health. Therefore, since
the charge of paternity is one easy
to make and very difficult to disprove, it would tend to simplify
this problem . .. ."
An appeal was then taken to the
Supreme Court of California which
sustained the trial court's decision
and for the following reasons as
stated in the Supreme Court's
opinion:
"Whatever claims the medical
profession may make for the test,
in California 'no evidence is by
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law made conclusive or unanswerable, unless so declared by this
code.' Section 1978, Code Civ.
Proc. .

. The law makes no dis-

tinction whatever between expert
testimony and evidence of other
character. .... Although it en-

courages the demonstration of the
truth of the issues before a court
by any means which are generally
accepted as tending to prove the
facts in dispute, 'when there is a
conflict between scientific testimony and testimony as to the facts,
the jury or trial court, must determine the relative weight of the
evidence.' Parentage is not exclusively a subject of expert evidence. The trial judge heard the
testimony of the mother of the
child and the witnesses who corroborated her concerning the numerous visits of the appellant to
her house, and his actions with the
child. The admissions of the defendant as related by these witnesses are also a part of the evidence. It was the duty of the judge
to determine the fact of parentage
upon all this evidence and to resolve the conflict arising from the
testimony of the mother and her
vitnesses on the one hand and the
evidence of the defendant, including the blood test, on the other.
The finding so made was based upon substantial evidence and may
not be successfully challenged upon appeal."
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that since the witness was not a
"ballistic expert" he should not
have been permitted to testify. To
this objection the Supreme Court
of Missouri said:
"The witness did testify that he
was not a ballistic expert, but that
he had much experience in the
work of identifying firearms; that
the term "ballistic expert' did not
apply to his line of work. In this
the witness may be technically correct. But, be that as it may, the
witness' testimony disclosed that he
was an expert in the identification
of firearms and bullets by the comparison method by means of a microscope. The method used in this
case to identify the shells and revolvers was similar to the method
employed in the case of State v.
Shawley, 334 Mo. 352, 67 S. W. (2d)
74. The question was there fully
considered and it was held that the
witness was qualified to testify.
The rule is now well settled that
such evidence is competent and
may be considered by the jury in
arriving at a verdict."

Firearhis Identification - Expert
Testimony as to the Distance a Fired
Shell Had Been Ejected- In the
case of Commonwealth v. Peronace,
195 Atl. 57 (Pa., 1937) an expert
testified that a revolver such as
that used by the defendant would
throw shells a certain distance (8
feet) if held in a normal position.
To this testimony the defendant obFirearms Identification-Qualifica- jected because "there was no spetions of Expert Witness- In the cific evidence to show that appelcase of State v. Couch, Ill: S. W. lant held the gun in a normal posi(2d) 147 (Mo., 1937) an expert tion." Upon appeal from the trial
witness testified to the effect that court's conviction the Supreme
various shells were fired from cer- Court stated that "In the absence
tain guns in evidence, which tes- of evidence to the contrary, appeltimony served to secure a convic- lant having admitted firing the gun,
tion against the defendant. Upon the jury could infer that he held it
appeal the defendant contended in a normal position"

